Patented drugs, generic alternatives, and intellectual property regimes in developing countries by Linda Cohen
American Law & Economics
Association Annual Meetings
Year 2004 Paper 52
Patented drugs, generic alternatives, and
intellectual property regimes in
developing countries
Linda R. Cohen
University of California, Irvine
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be
commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art52
Copyright c 
2004 by the author.Draft, March 28, 2004 
Patented drugs, generic alternatives and intellectual property 
regimes in developing countries 
Anita Charuworn
1 and Linda R. Cohen
2 
Abstract 
We consider when and to what extent a country will unilaterally protect intellectual 
property when it does no patentable innovation of its own.  Framing the strength of an 
intellectual property regime in terms of the scope of patents, our model analyzes 
incentives of developing countries to manufacture generic versions of patented goods.  
The model provides insights into where problems arise in negotiating intellectual 
property treaties, when multinationals want to license intellectual property for local 
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Section 1: Introduction 
In the past decade, intellectual property rights have been the subject of intense 
international trade disputes, and the focus of an increasingly rich theoretical and 
empirical academic literature.
3   While legal regimes that protect private property are 
usually thought to enhance international trade and yield pareto improvements in welfare, 
strengthening intellectual property rights can be a double-edged sword.  Global efficiency 
may benefit from a harmonized, strong intellectual property regime, but the interests of 
countries diverge.  Developing countries may be better off infringing the intellectual 
property of wealthy countries both to avoid paying monopoly prices and to spur domestic 
innovation that builds on foreign patents.
4 
Three principal reasons have been offered for why developing countries should 
want an effective intellectual property regime.  First, the high prices paid by developing 
countries for patented goods will sponsor more innovations, possibly for products geared 
to those countries such as tropical disease therapies (Diwan and Rodrik, 1999; 
McCalman, 2002b).  Second, if the developing countries do some innovation on their 
own, the rights protect and encourage local inventors(Grossman and Lai (2002)).  Third, 
stronger intellectual property rights might encourage foreign investment and provide 
opportunities to manufacture products that contain licensed foreign technology 
(Helpman, 1993). 
                                                 
3 Important early theoretical treatments include Chin and Grossman (1990); Deardorff (1992); Helpman 
(1993).  Maskus (2002a) provides a masterful overview and treatment of empirical issues. 
4 For example, McCalman (2002a) and Scotchmer (forthcoming) show how divergent interests among 
nations necessitated development of the DOHA Agreement to finalize the WTO discussion. 
  2
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art52Draft, March 28, 2004 
An extensive empirical investigation has yielded only mixed support for these 
justifications, particularly in pharmaceutical research.
5  Profits from developing countries 
contribute little to OECD countries’ research activities.
 6   The current controversy over 
parallel importation suggests that even profits from sales of patented drugs in Canada 
contribute little to pharmaceutical research in the United States.  Moreover, potential 
profits from sales of drugs developed for exclusive use in developing countries, even 
assuming patent protection, are much too small to support their research and 
development.
7    
Second, very little patent-yielding innovation occurs in these countries. Lall 
(2001) lists only 23 countries in the world with any significant patenting activity in the 
United States in 1997 -- all of them far wealthier than the targets of intellectual property 
treaties with developing countries.  Finally, while both trade and foreign direct 
investment are correlated with the presence of intellectual property rights, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the relationship between them is complicated.(Maskus, 2002a)  
Certainly a system to enforce contracts and property rights is valuable, but intellectual 
property appears neither necessary nor sufficient.  Brazil today, and Korea and Taiwan in 
the past, were notorious for weak enforcement of intellectual property, yet at the same 
time were the beneficiaries of heavy foreign direct investment.  Overall, the empirical 
literature presents a puzzle as to why developing countries provide as much protection of 
                                                 
5 See generally Maskus (2000a, 200b).  
6 See Abbott (2002) for a projected breakdown of R&D expenditures and sales of drugs in developing 
countries for pharmaceutical firms. 
7 Hsu and Schwartz (2003) find that small markets require a hybrid subsidy to drive research.  Lanjouw and 
Cockburn's study (2001) underscores the complexity of the relationships between intellectual property 
rights, wealth and innovation in developing countries. 
  3
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressDraft, March 28, 2004 
intellectual property as they do.
8 
  In this paper we develop a model that offers a different explanation for why and 
when developing countries would want to protect foreign intellectual property.  We focus 
on consumption rather than production, and show how the incentive to acquire a mix of 
products leads to a patent regime even if no innovative activity takes place in the 
developing country ("South"), and even if the purchase of patented goods in the South 
contributes nothing to innovation in the North.   
Our model diverges from the literature in two respects.  First, the quality of 
substitutes that are sold within the country measures the strength of the patent regime.  In 
the pharmaceutical context, which for several reasons is most relevant for our analysis, 
the regime affects the availability of generic substitutes.  Strong patent rights translate 
into availability of only low-quality alternatives.  Weak patent rights permit sales of high-
quality alternatives that are close substitutes to the patented product.  We thus 
characterize the strength of patents by their scope, or the extent to which substitutes are 
covered by the patent grant.  This characterization also provides a natural way to think 
about enforcement as a component of patent strength, so that functional intellectual 
property protection varies across types of products even when the legal structure is 
uniform. 
Second, we model a heterogeneous population in the South, where consumers 
have identical preferences but different incomes.
9   Some people prefer a cheap, low-
                                                 
8  Copyright is a different story: lost profits from infringement may well be significant, while some 
developing countries have important industries that rely on copyright protection.  The conditions thus 
appear more favorable to international harmonization, but the increasing ease of infringement presents 
possibly even greater problems for harmonization.  See Maskus, 2002a. 
  4
9 By contrast, Diwan and Rodrik (1991) consider heterogeneous consumer preferences. Southern 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art52Draft, March 28, 2004 
quality generic version, while others prefer higher-quality drugs at higher prices.  The 
heterogeneity allows us to investigate when countries prefer policies that allow a mix of 
products, including a patented alternative.  
Analytically our model draws from the quality ladder literature, although we have 
rearranged some of the rungs.
10   The patent-holder – a multinational company – can sell 
a drug of exogenously-determined quality.  The developing country then establishes an 
intellectual property regime, which dictates the quality of the generic alternative that will 
be sold at cost.  After the regime is established, the multinational company sets the 
quantity and price of the patented drug so as to maximize profits.  Exiting the market is 
an option.  Both of the drugs, one, or neither will be for sale.  
Finally, we abstract from general equilibrium considerations and ignore dynamic 
income effects from trade, foreign direct investment or production.   While our 
motivation for the abstraction is to acquire sufficient analytic simplicity to clarify and 
analyze the political economy questions posed here, we also note that governments as 
well as economists can be myopic.  The simplifications do not necessarily detract from 
the applicability of our results. 
Section 2 lays out our basic model.  In section 3 we show that the actions of the 
foreign company depend on three factors: the cost of the drug, the wealth of the 
developing country, and the level of intellectual property protection.  There is a minimum 
intellectual property standard at which the patented good is made available.   The 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumers make up a smaller market and have different preferences than their Northern counterparts, and 
therefore may seek to protect patent rights in order to drive innovation of Southern geared goods. The 
authors’ conclusions depend only the mean of each country's distribution.   
10 See, for example, Ronnen (1991), Shepard (1991), Deneckere and McAfee (1996).   
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minimum standard depends on the cost of the drug (more costly drugs require more 
stringent regimes) and the wealth in the country.  As wealthier people will pay more for 
the high-quality patent drug, less patent protection is needed in order to support its 
market.  In yet another injustice, poor countries need strong patent rights to insure the 
availability of patented goods, while rich countries get by with weaker intellectual 
property regimes.   
In section 4 we consider how a welfare-maximizing country sets its intellectual 
property regime.  Within certain income ranges and technology constraints, the 
intellectual property regime weakens as per-capita income increases.  This prediction is 
consistent with the strong empirical regulatory that intellectual property rights tend to 
decrease with increases in national income in developing countries, rendering those with 
the middle income, rather than the poorest, with the weakest intellectual property 
protection.  The relationship switches as countries become yet wealthier, and accelerates 
as they become fully developed.   Maskus (2000b) estimates that "the income at which 
patent protection becomes weakest is approximately $2000 per capita in 1985 
international dollars.  Moreover, the expected patent index is the same for economies 
with per-capita GNP of $500 and $7750, indicating that there is a large range of income 
variation before protection becomes stronger than at its low-income levels."  
The U-shape relationship between patent protection and national income is due in 
part to the large benefits from infringement in industrializing countries.
11  Patents can 
raise the cost of second-generation inventions, which rank high among the innovations of 
                                                 
11 See Khan (2002). 
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industrializing countries.
12   But while industrialization is important in explaining the left-
hand side of the U-shaped relationship between national income and patent rights, it does 
not tell the whole story.  Maskus (2000b) and Maskus and Penubarti (1995) show that the 
U-shape relationship holds after controlling for industrializing and research activities.   
In addition to the overall weakening of intellectual property rights with increases 
in per capita income, we show that there is an inverted U pattern for prices, the quantity 
of trade and the profits of the multinational company.   With higher per-capita income, a 
country demands more of the patented product (leading to an increase in its price) and at 
the same time improves the quality of the generic alternative (leading to increased 
competition and a decrease in the price of the patented drug).  Eventually the second 
effect dominates.  The wealthier among the developing countries thus pose a frustrating 
problem to multinational companies in foregone monopoly profits.   The possibility of 
parallel importation creates yet another headache, as it is in these countries that patented 
goods are both available and cheap.   
 
Section 2: Modeling basics 
  A multinational drug company has a patent on drug R, with a per-unit cost of CR.   
We do not model fixed costs here, but implicitly assume that some exist, as the drug will 
not be sold unless its price, PR, is strictly greater than its cost.  In addition to the patented 
drug, a generic good, G, may be offered for sale.  We assume that only a single generic 
version of the drug can be sold in the country at any time.  Our results generalize to the 
                                                 
12   Patents can reduce second generation due to the high cost of transacting licenses.  Also, Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) argue that the original innovator can strategically use her patent to block second 
generation products.  
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case where a limited menu is available.  The assumption is reasonable if production of the 
generic involves fixed costs and perhaps participation by the government itself. 
The quality of the drugs is given by V(.), where: 
  V(1) = VR = the quality of the patented good R 
  V(g) = the quality of good G, where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 
  V(0) = VO = the quality of a free alternative remedy 
We also index the strength of the country's intellectual property regime by g.  If g = 0, 
the country fully protects intellectual property (no generic drug is available).  When g = 
1, the country does not protect intellectual property, moreover, the technology is not 
inherently protected, so that a perfect generic alternative is available to good R. 
The cost of the generic good rises linearly in the index g, so that CG = gCR. The 
quality of the generic rises with g, but is subject to decreasing returns: 
  V'(g) > 0; V"(g) < 0 
We assume that the generic good is sold at a price equal to its marginal cost, CG. 
Consumers have income t, which is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, L].    
We will also characterize the income distribution or level of wealth in the country by L, 
although it technically refers only to the maximum income in the country.  Following 
Shepard (1991) and __, we assume that consumer t consumes at most 1 unit of drug, and 
her utility is defined by: 
  VOt  if she consumes the free alternative 
   U(t) =   V(g)(t - gCR)  if she consumes G 
  VR(t - PR)  if she consumes good R 
Consumers choose which (if either) good to consume so as to maximize utility. 
The definition of utility implies that there exist "tipping points" t1 and t2 such that 
  8
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consumer t consumes good O if 0 ≤ t ≤ t1; consumer t consumes good G if t1 <  t ≤ t2 and 
consumer t consumes good R if t2 <  t ≤ L.  These tipping points are given by: 
E1 



















The marginal cost of production for the patent drug is an important feature of the 
analysis, and is assumed to be substantial.  Some areas of intellectual property, notably 
copyright, seek to protect property with extremely low marginal costs.  Our model yields 
few insights in these cases.  However, the analysis is relevant to important categories of 
modern pharmaceuticals, where even countries that have established mandatory licensing 
for foreign technology and produce patented drugs themselves sometimes find the cost of 
treatment to be in excess of per-capita income.   
 
Section 3: What the drug company does 
  The drug company has a product of fixed quality VR, and decides whether to sell 
the drug in the country and if so, at what price.  We first characterize the monopoly 
solution, and then investigate how it varies with country conditions. 
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  All proofs are contained in the appendix. 
When the intellectual property regime is weakened, a better generic comes on the 
market to compete with the patented good.  The price of the generic drug increases along 
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with its quality.  Some consumers switch to the free alternative.  That brings no relief, 
however, to the monopolist.  The better generic, notwithstanding its higher price, takes 
away customers from the patented good.  The multinational finds that its profit-
maximizing strategy is to recoup some of the lost demand by lowering the price of the 
patented good, as is established in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2:  Suppose that for some range of prices P ≥ CR  the multinational company can 
sell its drug R at a profit.  Then the profit maximizing price, PR, declines when the 
intellectual property regime is weakened. 
Sales of patented drugs depend on the relative values of production cost, 
maximum income and the extent of patent protection.  The patented good will not be sold 
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The relationship among the different parameters is established in the following theorem 
and corollary. 
Theorem 1:  There exists a cost of production C1(g, L) such that the multinational will 
















Not surprisingly, for a given intellectual property regime g, as the country's 
income increases, the multinational will offer for sale more costly drugs.  The increasing 
income means a larger demand for the patent good.  The multinational can charge more 
for the drug, and the mark-up will be sufficient to cover costs (and then some) for more 
expensive drugs.  The second part of the theorem is more subtle.  Note that we hold the 
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quality of the patented drug constant.  As a result, the mark-up on less-expensive patented 
drugs is higher than the mark-up on more expensive versions.  When an increase in the 
generic quality causes price to decline, as is established in Lemma 2, the reduction 
squeezes out expensive drugs first.   
The monotonic partial derivatives in E4 mean that inverse functions exist to C1(g 
,L). We can characterize the minimum income L1(g, C) necessary for sale of a drug of 
cost C given an intellectual property regime g; and we can characterize the minimum 
intellectual property regime g1(C, L) necessary to insure the sale of a drug of cost C given 
maximum income L.  The existence of the second inverse function has two substantive 
implications.  First, the less wealthy a country is, the more stringent its intellectual 
property regime needs to be in order for sales of patented drugs of a given cost C.  
Second, for a given income distribution L, availability of more expensive drugs requires 
better intellectual property protection. Corollary 1 summarizes the conditions. 
Corollary 1:  There exists a function g1(C, L) defined over [C1(0, L), C1(1, L)]  such that  
g1 is the weakest intellectual property rights regime that a country with income L can 
sustain in order for a patented drug with cost C to be offered for sale, and such that: 












  Corollary 1 shows that wealthier countries can "afford" weaker intellectual 
property regimes.  The weak regime provides two benefits to the wealthier parts of the 
country: a high-quality generic is sold at cost, and the price of the patented drug is lower 
than it would be in a more stringent regime.  Poor countries, alternatively, will have none 
of the patented drug unless they protect patent rights to the extent that only low-quality 
generic drugs are available. 
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Section 4: What the state does 
The country socially optimizes the intellectual property regime at g, generating a 
single generic drug of quality V(g).  If both G and R are available, welfare in the country 
is given by the integral: 
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If g ≥ g1(C, L), then t2 = L, and the third term above is missing.   
To optimize welfare
13, the country sets: 
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Substituting from the definitions of t1 and t2: 
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Define gmax to be the value of g that satisfies equation E5. 
The following restriction on the production function V is sufficient to establish 
existence of a unique maximum. 
Condition A.  Let go be a solution to equation E5, i.e., a point where the first order 
conditions for a welfare maximum are satisfied, and 0 ≤ g0 ≤ 1.  Condition A is satisfied 
when either: 
  ) ( ' '
6













                                                 
13 A natural extension of this model is to consider other government objective functions, e.g., a median-
voter model or different welfare weights.   
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for all x such that 0 ≤ x ≤ g ≤ 1, or V’’’(go) ≥ 0.    
This condition is satisfied for any concave quadratic or cubic function, and also 
for any logarithmic function defined on the interval [0,1]. 
Theorem 2:  (existence) Suppose the production function V(g) satisfies Condition A.  
Then there exists a level of g that maximizes welfare in the LDC over the interval (0,1) in 
the presence of imports of the patented good and in its absence.   
Our analysis so far contemplates two regimes: one where the country maximizes 
welfare conditional on sales of the patented good, and the other where the country 
maximizes welfare assuming that the patented good is not for sale.  We first consider 
comparative static results for the optimal patent strength in each of the two regimes.  In 
both cases, an increase in L causes the optimal patent strength to weaken, and a more 
expensive patent drug is dealt with by strengthening patent rights. 
  Consider first the case where gmax < g1(C, L), so the expression in E5 has two 
terms.  Increasing L involves two reinforcing effects: the price charged by the monopolist 
increases when the country becomes wealthier.  As a result, t2 will increase, as people at 
the former tipping point will no longer purchase the patented drug.  These people now 
purchase the generic drug G.  G now caters to a (slightly) wealthier clientele on average 
who prefer a (slightly) higher quality generic drug.  In addition, notwithstanding the 
increase in t2, a greater share of the population is in the high-income category, and 
benefits from the reduction in PR that follows an increase in g.  It follows that as long as 
gmax < g1(C, L), the optimal IP regime is weaker, ceteris paribus, in wealthy countries. 
  For the case where no patented good is sold in the country (whatever the level of 
g) the analysis is straightforward.  An increase in L means that more people want a better 
quality generic, and hence the optimal patent regime becomes weaker.   
  13
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  Reducing the cost of the drug -- in effect, improving the technology, as we leave 
its value V(g) untouched -- has the identical effect to increasing the wealth of a country.  
The population shifts toward consumers who prefer either a higher quality generic or the 
patented drug itself.  Both groups are advantaged by a weaker intellectual property 
regime.  These results are summarized in Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3:  Let gmax be an interior welfare-maximizing intellectual property regime.  
Then the optimal intellectual property regime weakens as income increases, and 














Let g1(CR,, L) be the maximum value of g at which R is available in the country, 
g2(CR, L) be the level of g that  maximizes welfare in the absence of the patented good 
and g3(CR, L) be the level of g that maximizes welfare conditional on the availability of 
R.  We allow g2 to be defined even where g2 < g1 -- that is, where the defined intellectual 
property rights are strong enough to support the importation of the patented drug.  In this 
case, g2 is optimal only if some other condition has restricted the importation of the 
patented drug.  We can then compare g2 and g3: how does the optimal patent regime 
change when trade expands and drug R is introduced in the country?   The availability of 
good R creates an incentive to improve the quality of the generic, in order to lower the 
price of R.  However, the introduction of the patent drug also means that two drugs are 
now available, and a lower quality of generic will create greater quality dispersion.  As 
the following theorem proves, the second effect dominates.   
Theorem 4:  For all values of CR and L such that good G is sold, g3(CR, L) ≤ g2(CR, L).  
Whenever both G and R are sold, g3(CR, L) < g2(CR, L).   
  Theorem 4 does not suggest that the establishment of stronger intellectual 
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property rights leads to greater trade but a narrower hypothesis: holding income constant, 
when some other change in institutional conditions allows for greater trade – for example, 
an overall strengthening of contract law or the protection of real property rights -- both 
greater trade and stronger intellectual property rights will ensue.   
We now turn to choosing conditions for g2 or g3 to optimize welfare.  We first 
establish two technical lemmas. 
Lemma 3:  There exist inverse functions C1(g, L), C2(g, L), C3(g, L) dual to g1, g2, g3 
defined over (0, 1) such that C1(g, L) is the maximum cost at which R is sold given patent 
regime g, C2(g, L) is the cost at which patent regime g maximizes welfare for the country 
in the absence of patented good R, and C3(g, L) is the cost at which patent regime g 
maximizes welfare for the country conditional on availability of patented good R.  The 
derivatives of all three functions with respect to g are negative over the range (0, 1). 
Lemma 4:  g1, g2, and g3 intersect at a single point (g*, C*/L) where 0 < g* < 1. 
Lemma 4 is illustrated in Figure 1.  The figure depicts the curves where L = 1, and V(g) 
= 1 + log(1+g). 
Theorem 5:  There exists a regime-switching cost C* such that 0 < C* < L and: 
(i)  if CR > C* then the country maximizes welfare by choosing a level of intellectual 
property protection g2* such that R is not offered for sale in the country and g2* < 1.  
(ii) if CR < C* then the country maximizes welfare by choosing an level of intellectual 
property protection g3* such that both R and G are offered for sale and 0 < g3* ≤ 1. 
The theorem follows immediately from Lemma 4.  When C > C*,  R is not 
available in any of the three cases.  By definition, g2 maximizes welfare in this event, and 
thus a weaker IP regime is preferred to that which is just weak enough to marginalize the 
patented drug.  When C < C*, even if R were not available, the optimal intellectual 
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property level g2 would be set at a sufficiently strict level to allow its sale at a profit. g2 
with R is pareto preferred to g2 without R: consumers retain the option to purchase G2 at 
the same price as before, but some defect to purchase R instead.  But by construction and 
Theorem 4, g3 with R is strictly preferred to g2 with R, so g3 is the optimal regime when C 
< C*. 
The relationship between the cost of the patent drug, the country’s maximum 
income level and the choice of regime also follows directly from Lemma 4: 
Corollary 2:  The regime-switching cost C* is higher in wealthy countries; alternatively, 
given a drug of cost C, there exists a regime-switching level of wealth, L*, such that a 
country will set intellectual property levels stringent enough to attract entry of the patent 
drug if and only if L > L*. 
  The weaker intellectual property regimes in wealthier countries mean that better 
generic drugs are available.  They do not necessarily imply that the price of the patented 
drug is lower.  Suppose the country has chosen g3 to maximize welfare.  Increasing L 
holding g constant would cause the company to raise the profit-maximizing monopoly 
price of the patented good.  However, the increase in L also causes an increase in the 
welfare-maximizing level of g, which increases competition for the patented drug and 
















The effect of an increase in wealth on the price of the drug reflects these countervailing 
influences.  Close to L*, an increase in wealth causes the price of the drug on net to rise.  
Eventually the second component dominates, and heightened competition from G 
overwhelms the income effect.  As we show in Corollary 3, a similar inverted-U pattern 
holds for the drug company’s profits and sales volume. 
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Corollary 3   Let L ≥ L*.   For L close to L*, the price of the patented drug, the profits to 
the drug company, and sales volume increase as L grows.  For a sufficiently high level of 
L, further increases in wealth result in reductions in three variables.   
Corollary 3 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, where C is set constant at .35, V(g) = 
1 + log(1 + g), and L varies along the x-axis from 1.2 (where L = L*, equivalent to the 
intercept point in figure 1) to L = 2.3, where the optimal intellectual property regime, g3, 
goes to 1.  In between these two limits, the intellectual property regime is given by g3(C, 
L).  Figure 2 shows that up to about L = 1.7 the wealth effect dominates, and the price of 
the patent rises with increasing demand.     
Above L = 1.7, the weakening of the intellectual property regime (that is, the increase in 
g) and increased competition from a generic of increasingly higher quality causes the 
price of the patent good to fall, notwithstanding continued increases in L.  At L = 2.3, the 
IP regime limits to g = 1, so that generic quality approaches the quality of the patented 
good, the price of the patented good approaches its cost of 0.35.   
Figure 3 gives the results for profits.  As wealth increases, demand for the 
patented good grows.  Eventually competition from the generic drug causes the price of 
the patented drug to decline.   Notwithstanding the price reduction for the patented drug, 
further generic competition reduces demand for the patented good so that profits fall, 
approaching zero as g goes to one and imitation is complete. 
 
Section 5. Conclusions 
  Pharmaceutical patents are among the most valuable of patent classes, in part 
because it is difficult to protect the property using other means -- reverse engineering is 
possible -- and in part because it is easy to establish infringement in court.  Companies 
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have been eager to obtain patent protection for pharmaceutical products in developing 
countries, but to date their success has been tempered by financial and humanitarian 
concerns.  
  We consider when, and how much, a country will unilaterally protect intellectual 
property when it does no patentable innovation of its own.  We frame the patent strength 
problem as one of patent scope, which translates functionally into the extent to which 
substitute treatments resemble in quality the patented drug.  We analyze the impact of 
varying production costs of the drug and the wealth of the country on its incentives to 
strengthen or weaken patent rights.  We find that developing countries do have an 
incentive to limit the quality of generic substitutes when the cost of the patent drug is 
high.  By establishing a bound on imitation, the country can obtain both the patented drug 
and lower cost alternative drugs; in a poor country, this may be an optimal solution.   
  The model yields a number of predictions.  We predict that formal patent rights 
will be stronger in the poorest developing countries, and weaken with increased wealth.  
The patent drug will not be for sale in the poorest countries, but among those where it is 
for sale, its price initially increases, then decreases, with further increases in wealth.  The 
reason for the decrease is that the country develops an aggressively high-quality 
alternative drug.  In the event of parallel importation, these relatively wealthy countries 
constitute a major problem for multinational companies, as the developing country can 
provide not only a high-quality generic drug, but also an low-priced patented version. 
  The model also provides an argument for licensing patented drugs.  If a 
multinational enters the developing country market, the availability of the patent drug 
will, in some cases, discourage development of a high-quality generic.  Specifically, it 
will cause the country to degrade its own drug program, so that lower-cost generics are 
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available as well as the high-quality patented drug.  With increasing international trade in 
pharmaceuticals, discouraging the production of higher-quality generic versions is 
valuable to multinational companies. 
  We abstracted from any impact the developing country might have on a 
multinational's research program, claiming the small profits in developing countries as 
authority.  However, parallel importation renders the activities in developing countries 
less benign.  Our model suggests that the multinational company should react differently 
in the case of drugs with different costs.  Expensive drugs, according to our model, obtain 
protection in the developing world irrespective of international treaties.  Inexpensive 
drugs, on the other hand, spell trouble. Relative to the cost of inexpensive treatments, 
more countries are wealthy enough to want to develop close imitations of the drug.  Here 
the coordinating benefits of a treaty may be important.   While an individual country may 
lack incentives to strengthen its intellectual property regime, the combined efforts of 
many nations might provide a pareto efficient move with stronger intellectual property 
rights for the developing countries.
14  Our analysis suggests that while including 
developing countries in multilateral intellectual property treaties may be of only marginal 
use in encouraging research on expensive drugs, their inclusion may be critical for the 
development of inexpensive therapies. 
                                                 
14 The case is analogous to that analyzed by Romero (1991). 
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The price of the patented drug, PR maximizes (P - CR)(L - t2) subject to the constraint that 
price exceeds cost.  Substituting from E1 and solving the first order condition yields the 
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substituting from E3 and using the convexity condition: 
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The drug company makes positive profits only when demand for R is positive for some 
price PR ≥ CR.   Rearranging from Lemma 2, the drug company will not provide drug R 
when: 
 














It is clear from Equation A2 that C
*
R must be increasing in L.   
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2 > 0.  






By assumption, t2 = L, and equation E5 has only one term.  Without loss of generality we 
let CR = 1, and denote t1(g) by t(g), so that g becomes the cost of the generic good.  Note 
that this places a restriction on L for existence of an interior maximum, but the two 
parameters L  and CR are redundant parameters.  Solving the integral in E5. yields the 
following first order condition: 
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Let go be a solution to A3.  To establish a unique interior maximum it is sufficient to 
show that  
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As V’(g) >0 it is sufficient to show that: 
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Substitute A7 into A4 and rearrange: 
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The second term in A8 is always negative, as V’(g) > 0.  Turning to the first term, V’’(g) 














0 .   Using the Lagrange Remainder to the Taylor 
Expansion, 



















for some x such that 0 < x < g, hence a sufficient condition for the first term to be 
negative is that Condition A holds. 




Let 0 < gmax < g1 








 at g = gmax.  Totally 
differentiating and rearranging E5 yields: 
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W  at g = gmax < g1. 
 
We use the following substitutions: 
 



































2 g V V



























































) ( ) )( ( '  
 
substituting and simplifying: 
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substituting A10 into A9: 
 


















by convexity, V’(g)(1 - g) > VR – V(g), hence: 
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If the optimal IP regime g2 is weaker (i.e. larger) than the level at which R is sold by the 
MNC, then the lemma holds trivially, as by construction g3 < g1 < g2.  Suppose g2 is 
sufficiently small that the MNC would be willing to sell R, so that t2(g2, CR) < L, and 
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substituting from Theorem 2: 
 








As t2 < L, the condition cannot hold, that is, at g2, the benefits to the average consumer of 
G from reducing g outweigh the disutility to average consumers of R from the increase in 
the price of R that results from a decrease in g.  Thus g2 is too high (the patent regime is 
too weak) to be optimal in the presence of sales of R, and g2 > g3. 




The existence of C1(g) comes by definition from Corollary 1.  The derivative of C1 with 
respect to g is shown there to be negative everywhere on the interval (0,1), which 
establishes the existence of its inverse g1(C) over the range (C1(0), C1(1)*).  
 
By Theorem 3, both g2 and g3 have negative derivatives with respect to C over the ranges 
where g is feasible ((0,1)) and where they solve for an interior maximum.  For g2 
solutions exist for g ε (0,1).  For g3 the relevant range is (0, C*) for some C
* < L (see 
Theorem 5, below).  At C*, g3 = g1; for larger values of C, g3 by definition equals g1, 
hence g3 has a negative derivative with respect to C over the relevant range.  Thus C2 and 




We prove this using the dual functions C1, C2, and C3 defined above, and show that : 
 
(1) the curves defined by C1 and C2 cross such that for small values of C,  g1 > g2 and 
vice versa for large values of C. 
 
(2) C1 and C3 are such that for all C less than some C* , g3 < g1  and for larger values of 
C, g3 is set at the boundary g1. 
 
(3) C* must be the same point where g1 and g3 cross, so all three curves intersect at a 
single point (g*, C*).  This is shown in figure 1 below for the case where L = 1 and V(g) 
= 1 + log(1+g). 
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proof of (1) 
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V(1) > V(0), and by convexity, V'(0) > V(1) - V(0),  hence C2(0) > C1(0). 
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With appropriate simplifications, 
 
  C2(1) < C1(1) ÍÎ V'(1)V(0) < V(1)(V(1)-V(0). 
 
V(0) < V(1) and by convexity, V'(1) < V(1) - V(0), hence C2(1) < C1(1).  Thus C1(g) = 
C2(g) for some 0 < g < 1, or g1(C) = g2(C) for some C ε (C1(1), C1(0)). 
 
proof of 2: 










, then R will not be available for 
any value of g. Thus, g3 cannot have an interior solution for a range of costs C < L, where 
by definition g3 = g1; alternatively, for g sufficiently small, there is no positive cost of R 
such that welfare is maximized conditional on the availability of both G and R. 
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By Theorem 4, g3(C) < g2(C) for all C such that g2(C) < g1(C).  By part 1 of this proof, 
positive values of C exist such that g2(C) < g1(C).  Hence, for a range of C, g3 < g2 < g1. 
 
proof of 3: 
 
Solving the integral in E5 and substituting for PR, t1 and t2 yields the following condition 





























































































































Let g be such that C1(g) = C3(g) and A13 is satisfied, so that maximizing welfare subject 
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The first term in A14 cannot be zero as 0 < g < 1, hence the second term must be zero.  
Solving the term for C3 yields an expression identical to the equation for C2 in A11.  
Hence, C3(g) = C2(g) when C3(g) = C1(g), and there is a value g = g*, and associated 
cost C*, such that the two maximizing strategies converge and the intellectual property 
level set such that the price of the patented good is set exactly equal to its cost. 




The expressions in A11 and A12 show that C and L occur as a ratio in all three equations 
defining g1, g2 and g3.  Hence an increase in L, accompanied by a proportionate increase 
in C, will maintain the identities g1 = g2 = g3, or the regime-switching cost C* increases 





Near L* the net effect in A14 must be positive: at L*, the price of the patented good is set 
equal to its cost, C.  An increase in L results in maximum welfare at g3 > g
*, but by 
Theorem 5, g3 < g1 at L > L*, so positive amounts of the patented good are sold and PR 
>C. 
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While the price of the patented good remains above its cost as long as g < 1 and L > L*, 





























As is shown in Theorem 5, C3(g) < C1(g), and  
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Hence, for g sufficiently close to one,  
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From A9 and A16,  
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Substituting A15, A17 and A18 into E6 establishes that for sufficiently large values of g 
< 1, dP/dL < 0. 
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Figure 3 
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